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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GARY M. NAGLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

vs.

CLUB FONTAINB'LEU, a Utah
corporation,

Case No.
10198

Defendant- Respondent.

APPELLAN'T'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action commenced ~by the Plaintiff
for the specific performan'Ce of an agreement 1and
assignment, or in the alternative, for a judgment
against the Defendant for monies due and owing on
an agreed account for improvements to real property and for monies due on a promissory note and
also for the foreclosure of the Plaintiff's mechanic's
lien.
DISPO'SITION IN LOWER C'OUIR'T
The Plaintiff was ·awarded ju~dgment against
the Defen·dant in the amount of $19,738.48 and
1
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$S2.'70 costs of court, but the trial court held that
the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid and the
Agreement and Assignment between the parties,
dated September 1, 19H2, provided for a penalty
and could not be enforced.
RE:LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the reversal of those portions
of the trial court's judgment which held the Plaintiff's mech\anic's lien to be invalid and the Agreement an·d Assignment between 'the parties, da;ted
September 1, 19'62, to be a penalty and unenforceable.
STA'TEMENT OF FACTS
T·he Defen·dant is a non-profit corporation
organized for the recreation of its members. It succeeded to the Buyer's position under a Uniform
R eal Estate ·Contract dated M1ay 23, 1960, to purch·ase the real 'property commonly known as 1651
Vin·e Street, ~salt Lake ·City, Utah. The Defendant
retained for itself 6.3 5 acres of the land it was
purchasing ,and sold th·e rem·ainder to th·e Plaintiff
for residential building lots. !The Plaintiff, a general contractor, entered into a written agreement
with the Defendant dated in April, 19'60, but probably sign~d in May or June, 1960, whereby the
Plaintiff agreed to move a cooler hous·e and construct a water line, sewer line, roadway, and bridge
adjoining and to connect with the real property of
the Defendant. The Defendant agreed to pay the
1

1

2
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Plaintiff a proportionate s'hare of the cost of the
improvements, varying ·between one-third and onehalf of the total, with the Plaintiff to p ay the oth'er
share since the Plaintiff would also benefit from
the planned improvem·ents. T he Defendant agreed
to pay the P'laintiff as th·e work progressed iand
invoi,ces were submitted. Th·e Defendant further
agreed to deposit in trust $1,000.00 wi'thin fortyfive ( 45) ·days as evidence of its good faith and
abi lity to pay. ·such sum was never deposited.
1

1

1

T·he Plaintiff furnished his first labor and materials on November 8, 1960. During March or
April, 1961, the Plaintiff displayed various invoices
for labor and materiials 'to the Board of Directors
of Defendant, but Defendant had no funds to make
payment. In August, 19'61, th'e Plaintiff submitted
to the Defendant an itemized invoi·ce in the :amount
of $12,277.26, which was accepted and approved by
Don E. H1ammill, the President of the Defendant
Club, but the Defendant was still not able to make
a paym·ent on account. The Plaintiff completed the
moving of the cooler house ·and con~s'truction of the
water line rand sewer line, but did not eomplete
the roadway and bridge until approximately o~cto
ber 15, 1962, due to the flailure of the Defendant
to make payment.
1

In January, 1961, the Plaintiff became a member of the Defendant, and in January, 196'2, the
Plaintiff was elected to its Board of Dire·ctors. The
3
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Defendant desired to complete the construction of
its basic improvem·ents so that its members could
enrjoy the facilities, but did not :have sufficient funds
on h·and for this purpose. The 'Defendant commenced
a members:hip drive in March, 196'2, to obtain the
required funds and entered into a verbal contract
with the Ptaintiff to construct a club house and deck
around the swimming pool. The PLa;intiff was to
receive the funds: made avail'alble by the new memberships as well as labor to be donated by the members of the Defendant, so that the facilities would
be ready by June 1, 196'2. The membership drive
was unsuccessful, the Plaintiff was not p1aid any
funds, and the mem·bers did not don~ate the labor as
promised; however, the Pl'aintiff completed suffici'etn of the construction work so that the facilities
could be used during the month of July, 1962. The
Plaintiff performed his last labor and furnished
his materials on November 5, 1962, when several
doors were hung in the club house and it was prepared for winter.
The Defendant was still not able to pay the
Plaintiff for the construction of the club house and
decking around the swimming pool, and on September 1, 196'2, the Defendant executed and delivered
to the Plaintiff its promissory note of even date
in the original principal amount of $11,000.00, payable to the order of the Plaintiff one year from its
date, with interest at 67o per annum, in payment
of labor and materials for the construction of the
4
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club house and ·decking 1around the swimming pool,
the Defendant h·aving already approved Pl'ainti:ff's
invoice of $12,277.'26 for the other work performed
by Plaintiff. T'he promissory note contained an aecelleration clause whereby the Plaintiff could mature the note upon deeming himself insecure. 'This
promissory note was secured by an Agreement ~a.nd
Assignment of the same date, wherein the Defendant
assignmed to Plaintiff all of the Defendant's right,
title, and interest in and to its Uniform Real Estate
Contract of May 23, 19'60, under which its real
property was being purchased. The Agreement :and
Assignment provided, among other things, that in
the event of default the Plaintiff could enter upon
the premises and take possession th·ereof and any
amounts paid him would be retained as liquidated
dam!ages and upon demand the Defendant would
execute an·d deliver a Quit C1aim Deed of its interest in the real property. Paragrap'h 4 of the
Agreement and Assignment stated that the Plaintiff could file and prosecute any mechanic's or materialmen's liens he might have against the property.
Since the Plaintiff had received no paym·ent on
either contract, and for the purpose of further protecting ·himself, the P1aintiff recorded his Notice
of Lien in the County Recorder's office of S·alt Lake
County, U~tah, on December 17, 196'2, as Entry No.
1888590, in Book 1998, at Page 241, of Official
Records:. In March, 1963, the Plaintiff desired to
obtain clear title to the acreage he was purch'asing
5
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from the Defendant and paid the Defendant $10,771.06 to en~able the Defen·dant to in turn pay said
sum to the fee title owners so that title could be
obtained and in addition the Plaintiff received a
credit of $6,649.78 on the bill of $1'2,'277.26, owing
to the Plaintiff, which credit was later corrected
during the trial proceedings to $5,64:9,78. This
transaction between t~he parties is reflected in a written Credit Agreement, dated March 7, 19'6'3, is one
of the trial ex'hibits, and a part of the record. The
P'laintiff later deemed himself insecure, acceUera1ted :the maturity date of the note and made written
demand upon the Defen·dant on April 10, 1963,
for ·paym'ent in full. Afiter considerable negotiations,
the Defendant on M·ay 10, 1963, offered to pay the
note, but m·ade no actual tender of the monies due
and owing. The Defendant's offer did not include
reasonable attorney's fees as provided in th'e promissory note and under the Uta:h Statutes on Mechanic's Liens, nor the cost of recording his Notice
of Lien an·d was rejected by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then filed suit aga~inrS't the D'efendant to enfoce the terms of the Agreem·en't and Assignment of
·September 1, 1962; also for the payment of the promissory note and for the foreclosure of his mechanic's lien. Plaintiff ·also included in his suit a demand for additional labor performed and personal
services of the Plaintiff.
The valu'e of the Defendant's real property
would not exeeed $8,000.00 per acre. (Page ·21, Line
6
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17 of the Excerpts of Transcript of Proceedings)
T~he Defendant owes a balance un·der its. contract
of May 23, 1960, to purchase the real property, of
approximately $·2'"7 ,000.00.
ARGUMENT
P 0'INT I.
1

THAT THE TRI.A!L COURT ERRED IN H·OlJDING
PLAINTI'FF'S ME CHANIC'E LIEN INVA:LID.
1

The Plaintiff, a general contractor, is one of
those persons entitled to a mechanic's lien as set
forth in Title 38-1-3, U.C.A. Also, the Pl~aintiff is
an original contractor as defined in 38-1-2, U.C.A.,
and recorded his Notice of Lien in sufficient detail
and within the time required by 38-1-7. 'The Plaintiff's action was commenced within one year after
he furnised his last labor and material and ·his Lis
Pendens was recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in the manner
specified in 38-1-11. Notice to other lien claimants
of the pending action an·d the tim·e for them to appear and exhibit their liens was published once per
week for three successive weeks, pursuant to 38-1-1'2.
No liens were exhibited nor a·ppearan·ces m·ade by
other lien elaimants on the day appointed.
Although the Memo~andum Decision of the
trial court and the Findings, Con·clusion~s and J udgment do not state the reason for the holding th.at
the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid, the remarks of the trial judge during the trial proceed7
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ings were to the effect that the Plaintiff's bill for
labor and m~aterials was paid by the Plaintiff accepting the $11,000.00 promissory note of September 1, 19'6'2, an·d in so doing the P'laintiff had waived
hi~s right to a mechanic's lien. It is respectfully submitted that su·ch is not the law in the State of Utah
nor the law of a majority of the 'other jurisdictions'
in this country. In the Uta·h case of L. E. Doame,
et ~al., Respondents, v. Jeter Clinton Z. Snow, et al,
Appellants, heard by our Suprem·e Court while Utah
was still a territory during the term from January,
1877, to June, 1880, reported in 2 U. 417, th~e Plaintiff accepted two prommissory notes from one of
the Defendants for the amount due for building materials :an·d three months thereafter recorded his
Notice of Lien to secure the amount due and owing.
T'he trial court granted judgnTen:t in favor of the
Plaintiff and for the foreclosure of his mechanic's
lien, an·d one of the Defendants appealed. By a unanimous decision, the ·Chief Justice and both Associate Justices affirmed. In quoting from the Court's
opinion, Justice Boreman stated, "It is claim·ed that
by ·accepting these notes, the respondents received
payment of the account. This certainly i>S not the
law, where no intention to tha;t effect is shown.
"We presume the appellants meant to say that
the respondents waived their right to the lien by
taking the notes. ·Our Statute says that the lien can
be enforced by suit begun at any time within one
year after the completion of the building. Both notes
8
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fell due within the year, and th·ere does not appear
to have been any intention to relinquis·h the lien.
There was, therefore, no waiver of 'the right to file
the lien or to enforce it. Securities are in their
nature cumulative, and there is no reason why the
Court s;hould consider tha:t by taking one a party
thereby released another, unless there was some
stipulation or misun·derstanding th·at such should
be the case. McMurry v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 2'63; Ashdown v. Woods, 3 Mo. 4·65; Green v. Ely, 2 Greene,
(Iowa), 508; Mix v. Ely, Ibid. 513; Kinsley v. Buchanan, 5 Watts, 118.
"We do not think that any different view is
bourne out by the authorities ci'ted by appellants."
The Uta:h case cited h'as long been and still is
the law in the State of Utah. 'This case has been
cited many times by other jurisdictions to the same
effect. In 65 A.L.R. 283, numrerous cases represen'ting the weight of authority are cited with the same
holding as the Utah ease above mentioned, being
thirty-nine states in our country ·and also Canada
and England. This position is further supported by
57 C.J.S. 798, Sec. 226.
T'he promissory note executed ·by the Defendant
and delivered to the Plaintiff matured by its terms
on September 1, 1963, being a tim~e within the oneyear period allowed by our Sta1tute for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. Also, there is nothing in
the note, nor in the facts and testimony s·howing an
9
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intention of the parties that the Plaintiff in acc·ep'ting the promissory note relinquished his rights to
a mechanic's lien, an·d indeed show a contrary intent
a~s will be mentioned below.
Nor does the fiact that the Plaintiff accepted
security for the note, being the Agreement and Assignment of September 1, 196'2, alter the result.
Although counsel for the Appellants could find no
Utah law on this specific point, the genera~ rule is
that accepting notes secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust does not amount to a waiver of a mechanic's
lien unless the parties so intend. Hale v. Burlington,
C.R. & N.R. Co. ( 1881; C.C.) ·2 McCrary 5'58, 13
Fed. 203; Gilcrest v. Gottscholk ( 1874) 39 Iowa 311;
Gretchell v. Musgrove (1880) ·54 Io~a 744, 7 N.W.
154; McKeen v. Haseltine (1891) 4·6 Minn. 426,49
N.W. 195; Hoagland v. Lask (1891) 33 Neb. 376,
29 Am. St. Rep. 485, 50 N.W. 162; Farmers & M.
Nat. Bank v. ~aylor ('1897) Tex. 40 S.W. 876.
6'5 A.L.R. 303.
1

Any guessing as to the intention of the parties
with respect to the Plaintiff's lien rights was removed by Ba:ragraplh 4 of the Agreement an·d Assignment between the p·arties, where it provides, among
other things, that the Assignee (Plaintiff), at his
option, could file and prosecute any mechanic's or
materialmen's lien 'he may nave against said property. It would thus app·ear ·that there was no intention to re'linquish or waive the mechanic's lien
10
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rights of the Plaintiff and that the Utah case cited
is controlling and the Plaintiff's m·echanic's: lien
rights were still in effect and ·his lien was valid.
POIN'T II.
'THAT THE TRIA'L C·O'U'RT ERRED IN H·OLDI'NG
THE A·GREE'ME·NT AN'D ASSIGNMENT ·BETIWEEN
THE PARTIES, DATED SE P'TEIM·BER 1, 1962, TO BE
A ·PENA~TY RATHE'R THA:N A FO'RFE'ITURE.
1

1

Whether a sum named in a ·contract to be paid
by a party in default on its breach is to be considered
liquidated damages or merely a penalty, is one of
the most difficult and perplexing inquiri'es en·countered in the constru~tion of written agreements.
Sun Printing etc., Assoc. v. Moore, 18'3 U.S. 642,
2'2 S. Ct. 240, 46 L. Ed. 3'6'6.
1

It seems to be generally conceded, that each
case must be permitted to stand pretty much on its
own peculiarities and particular facts. Keeble v.
Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 S. 149, Grand Union Laundry
Co. v. Garney, 88 Was'h. 327, 15'3 P. 5. No general
rules applicable to all contracts are deducible. Dopp
v. Richards 43 U. 332, 13'5 P. 98. The question is
one to be determined by the contract fairly construed. Dopp v. Richards, K. P. Min. Co. v. Jacobson,
30 U. 115, 83 P. 728, 4 L.R.A.N.S. '75·5.

At the time of the execution ·and delivery of the
$11,000.00 promissory note and Agreement and Assignment, ·both dated Septem'ber 1, 19'6'2, the Plaintiff had previously moved the cooler h'Ouse, con11
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structed the water and sewer lines, and substantially constructed the roadway and bridge, and the
Defendant had previously accepted and approved
the Plaintiff's invoice for said work, in the amount
of $I2,277.26, but had made no payment on account,
nor ·had the Plaintiff been paid for the construction
work performed on the club house and pool deck.
The Plaintiff was to have been p·aid for his work
on the club house and pool deck from proceeds of a
membership drive. Such drive was not successful
and the Defendant did not obtain funds to pay the
Plaintiff. At this time, the Defendant Wlas indebted
to the Palintiff in the amount of $·2'3,2 7'7.26, and
p'aym!e:nt was long past due. ~~he Plaintiff could have
commenced an action against the Defen·dant to collect the monies due him, the effect of which would
probably h1a1ve been to close down the Defendant
Club. The Defendant planned on making additional
improvements and operating the facilities, which
would probtbly h·ave resulted in incurring new indebtedness, making it more difficult for the Plaintiff to receive payment. These special facts and circum,s·ta;nces were in existence and known to the
parties at the time the promissory note and Agreement an·d Assignment were executed and delivered.
The reason for the ·provision in the Agreement and
Assignment that in the event of ·a default in payment of the note, the Plaintiff could enter upon the
premises, take possession, together with all improvements and any :a:mounts repaid to be retained
1

12
1
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as liquidated damages, was for the protection and
security of the Plaintiff for his forbearance. The
Agreement and Assignment was prepared by Don
E. Hammill, President of the Defendant and a practicing attorney, his name /being imprinted in the
lower left corner of this document.
In the Utah case of Perkins et .al. v. Spencer,
a 1952 case, 121 U. 468, 24 3 P. 2d 446, the Supreme
Court of Utah had occasion to consider the matter
of a penalty in connection with the buyer's default
under ~a uniform real estate contract. Justice Crockett, who wrote the opinion of th~e Court, stated,
''This Court is ·committed to the doctrine, th·at where
the parties to a contract stipulate the amount of
liquidruted dam·ages that shall be paid in case of a
breach, such stipulation is, as a gen·eral rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained." Al8o,
'~O·n the contrary, wh·ere enforcement of the forfeiture provision would allow an uncons~cionable and
exhorb]tant recovery bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual damage suffered, we have uniformly iheld it to be unenforceable.'' The Court commented on other Utah cases dealing with the same
question and ndted they were in accord with Sec.
339 of the Restatement of Contracts, which provides,
" ( 1) an agreement made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, i~s not enforceable as a
contract and does not affect the damages recoverable from the breach, unless (a) ·the amount so fixed
1

13
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is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for
the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the
harm that is caused by th·e breach is one that i~s
in·capable or very difficult of accurate estimation."
At page 21, line 17 of the Excerpts of Transcript of Proceedings, th·e president of the Defendant
testified ·that some land near the Defendant's real
property had been sold for $8,000.00 per acre. The
Defendant ·C'lub was purch·asing 6.3 5 acres, which
would. be a value of $50,800.00. The President of
the Defendant al,go testified th1a1t the balance due and
owing on the contract was approxim:ately $'2'6,000.00,
which would give the Defendant a net equity of
approximately $'24,800.00. 'The Plaintiff's total
judgement was for $1'9,'7'91.18, which total is not
disproportionate to the net equity indieruted, the
amount of said equity being somewh·a:t in question.
1

As to the point of whether the Plaintiff's damages were incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation, the record and undisputed facts clearly
show thJaJt the Defendant was in th·e financial position of being in·capable of meeting i'ts bil1s as they
became due and owing and therefore was technically
insolvent. Although the 1arnoun't of money owing by
the Defend·ant to the Plaintiff was known, the financial condition of the Defendant m:a:de the damage
to the Plaintiff through a failure to pay one which
was incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation. It is respectfully submitted to this Court that
the question of damage is not just the simple mea14
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surement of an amount due and owing, but includes as wel'l the prospects of recovery. Tihe question as to whether a provision is one for liquidated
damages or a penalty seems based upon whether
a party is to be allowed an unconscion·able gain.
Where no such unconscion:able gain is pres·ent, it
would be a miscarriage of justice to define damage
in the n1arrow sense of just the ·amount due and
owing, wi'thout including as is presented ~by this
case, the chances of an ultimate recovery. Such a
holding by this ·Court would be consistent with the
prior Utah cases and would ·prevent a miscarriage
of justice.
p·o(INT I'll.
·THAT THE DEFENDANT, THROUGH ITS c·oND'U'GT, H.NS WAIVED THE RIG'HT TO Q'UESTI'ON
THE VAIJIDITY OF THE AGREEMEN'T AIN·D ASSIG·NMENT OF SEPTE MBER 1, 196·2, AND IS ES'TOPPE D
F1ROM CLAIMING THAT TT EXA:C·TS PENALTY.
1

1

The promissory note and Agreement and As~
signment of September 1, 19'62, were both ·prepared
by the President of the Defendant, Don E. H·ammill,
1a; practicing attorney. 'Mr. Hammill was a person
trained in the law and h·ad a superior knowledge of
legal matters as compared with 'the Plaintiff, who
was a layman. It could be safely stated that in realding these documents, the Plaintiff concluded that
the wording meant exactly wha;t it said and in accepting said document for further forbearta;n·ce, the
Plainftiff relied upon the remedies given to him in
15
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the Agreement and Assignment. Upon the execution of these documents, 'the Defendant received a
valuable benefit, i.e., time within which to further
develop the Defendant C'lub and raise new capital.
Where on·e receives the benefit from a contract, he
is ~estopped from questioning the existence, validity
an~d effect of the contract. 21 C.J. t209, Sec. 211
(C).
In the U'tah case of Ravarino v. Price, et al.,
195'3, 123 U. 559, 260 P. 2d. '570, the Utah Supreme
Court had occasion 'to consider the matter of an
estoppe l against the Defense of tile Statute of
Frauds. In considering this quest!on, the Court held
that ·a promise which the promisor sh'Ould reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
·definite 1a:nd substantial character on th'e part of
the promisee, an·d which does induce su·ch action or
fo~bearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of 'the promise. Further, that
a promissory estoppel is applied where the promise
of the promisor as to his future conduct constitutes
an intended abandonment of an existing right on his
part. Should this Court consider the agreement in
question to have provided for ~a penalty, it would
ap~pear that the docum~ent h'aving been prepared by
the .Defen·dant's President, a legally trained individual of superior kn,owledge to the Plaintiff, the
Defendant has waived and is estopp,ed to claim thJat
such documenit provides for a penalty where the
Plaintiff relied upon the same in forbearance of
1
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the monies due and owing to 'him, all to his d'etriment
and loss.
CON'CL USION
It is earnestly contended by the Plaintiff th1at
the provision in question in the Agreement and Assignmen of September 1, 196'2, is not a penalty f.or
the reason~s mentioned in the argument on Point I,
and that this Court should so :hold in its opinion
and remand ·this cause to th·e trial court with instructions that the Defendant be ord'ered to Quit
Claim its interest in the real property to the P1aintiff in accordance wi'th the terms of said Agreement
and Assignment.
'Should this ·Court determine however, th·at such
provision in the Agreement and Assignment is a
penalty, that the Defendant has waived the right
to claim the same and due to the speci1a1 facts and
circums~ances present and the superior legal knowledge of the President of the Defendant and the
benefits received of forbearance through the Plaintiff agreeing to accept the promissory and Agreement and Assignment, the Defendant is and hlas
been estopped to assert the matter of ·a penalty as
a defense.
Irrespective of the above, it is the Plaintiff's
considered conclusion th~at he ·has a valid mechanic's
lien which was not w.aived 'through his acceptance
of the promissory note and Agreement and Assignm·ent and all of the requisite, statutory and proce17
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dural steps. for its foreclosure were met. This conclusion is fully supported by the facts of this case,
which can he interpreted in ·no other way, and especially is it _supported by the case law of 'this State.
(L.- E~ Doane, et ~al., Respondents, v. Jeter Clinton
Z._Sr~ow, et~al., Appellants)
.
From·tne standpoint of the prompt administration ·of- justice, the Appellant -prefers the relief prov~ded .~n- the Agreement ~and Assignment, ·i.e., the
right to take possession of ·the real property in question .an·d receive a Quit Claim Deed of all of the
r·}ght, title, interest and equity of tfue Respondent.
However, if for some rea'Son ·this Honora:ble Court
does not agree wilth the contention th1at the provision
in.the Agreement an·d Assignm·ent is not a penalty,
or· if it is that the Respon·dent ·has waived the right
fo- assert the same and is estopped therefrom, then
this matter S hould be rem·anded to the trial court
with instructions .·fuat Appellant's mechanic's lien
is valid !and. an Order to be entered by 1Jhe trtal court
permitting i ts foreclosure an·d a Sheriff's ·sale in
the manner ·provided by 'law.
1

1

R·espeetfully submitted,
HALLIDAY & HALLIDAY
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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